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ABSTRACT 
 
Does Corruption Promote Emigration? 
An Empirical Examination 
 
This paper empirically investigates the relationship between corruption and the emigration of 
those with high, medium and low levels of educational attainment. The empirical results 
indicate that as corruption increases the emigration rate of those with high levels of 
educational attainment also increases. The emigration rate of those with middle and low 
levels of educational attainment, however, increases at initial levels of corruption and then 
decreases beyond a certain point. Splitting the sample by income inequality suggests that 
increased inequality reduces the ability to emigrate. The policy conclusion is, that 
government actions should focus on controlling corruption, which in turn would lead to funds 
being channeled more productively into education and also lead to a fall in inequality which 
would reduce emigration. 
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1. Introduction 
Neo-classical migration theory views emigrants as individual, rational players who decide to 
move on the basis of a cost-benefit calculation. This theory perceives migration as leading to 
an optimal allocation of resources through which wages are equalised across countries due to 
the movement of labour, from surplus to scarce countries. Structuralists critique the neo-
classical theory stating that individuals do not have a free choice to move as they are 
fundamentally constrained by structural forces or alternatively, are forced to move due to 
economic and political reasons (de Haas 2007). Dependency theorists argue that migration is 
not necessarily an overall beneficial process as it leads to an extraction of labour from the 
periphery to core deepening the vicious cycle of poverty in the periphery and accelerating 
growth of the core. There are however, a number of push and pull forces brought about by 
demographic change, globalization, political conflict, institutions and climate change that 
have increased migration pressures both within and across borders (de Haas, 2007)
 1
 . 
 
In the present study, we focus on corruption as a push factor for labour emigration. The 
existence of corruption could lower the returns to education slowing down the process of 
economics growth acting as a push factor for out-migration (Dimant et al. 2013). In the 
presence of corruption, jobs are not granted based upon merit but political connections. This 
could lead to higher levels of unemployment and/or underemployment, lowering the returns 
to the stock of human capital. Corruption has been also been found to change the size and 
composition of public expenditure away from vital sectors such as health and education 
(Mauro 1998, Wei 2001) toward sectors which involve greater secrecy and less transparency 
such as defence. Gupta et al. (2002, 2000) argue that corruption affects the provision of 
                                                          
1
 See de Haas (2007) for a survey of the literature. Much of the theoretical work on remittances has been 
devoted to the primary motive of migrants to remit. Among the motives put forward are, altruism (Banerjee 
1984), insurance (Rosenzweig, 1988), investment (Lucas and Stark 1985), inheritance (Hoddinott 1994), risk 
diversification (Stark and Levhari 1982). 
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health and education services, by increasing the cost and lowering the quality of these 
services. Similarly, Kaufmann et al. (1999), show that corruption reduces life expectancy and 
literacy, and increases infant mortality rates. Following from this, corruption can therefore, 
lower the stock of human capital and reduce the returns to education by slowing down 
growth, generate unemployment and/underemployment (or reduce labour force participation), 
increase inequality and reduce welfare (Gould and Amaro-Reyes, 1983, Dimant et al. 2013) 
acting as a push factor for labour migration.  
 
The limited literature that exists on corruption and migration focuses on the impact of 
corruption on skilled migration (Dimant et al. 2013, Ariu and Squicciarini 2013). The impact 
of corruption on other migrant categories has been overlooked in the literature. Therefore, our 
contribution to the literature is threefold: (1) Employing the panel dataset of Brücker et al. 
(2013) for emigration, we hypothesise that corruption not only increases the emigration rate 
of those with high levels of educational attainment, but also, those with medium and low 
levels of educational attainment; (2) we also investigate, for the first time, potential non-
linearities in the relationship between corruption and emigration. This question has not been 
addressed in the literature. Studies have found a non-linear relationship between corruption 
and growth (Aidt 2003, Méndez and Sepúlveda 2006). However, we wish to understand if 
corruption has the same effect on the emigration of those with different levels of educational 
attainment; (3) we also for the first time, split the sample into two groups by country and 
time: those with low levels of income inequality (below the mean Gini index in the sample) 
and those with high levels of income inequality (above the mean Gini index in the sample), to 
investigate if the effect of corruption on emigration is dependent on the level of income 
inequality. 
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The results suggest that corruption beyond a certain threshold level of corruption reduces the 
emigration rates of those with medium and low levels of educational attainment. Results also 
indicate that income inequality reduces the ability to emigrate. Results are tested for 
robustness in a number of ways: additional control variables to capture a range of possible 
influences on emigration, interaction terms, different estimation methods including fixed 
effects estimation to account for country level time invariant unobservable influences on 
emigration, system GMM and IV estimation to correct for any potential endogeneity bias. 
Given the uncertainty and likely measurement errors in corruption, the robustness of the 
results are tested using two different data sets on corruption: the Transparency International 
(TI) and Kaufmann et al. (2012) data sets.  
 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the literature. Section 3 
presents the data and methodology.  Section 4 evaluates the results and section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Literature 
Corruption is the result of poor institutions. Despite the large literature investigating the 
relationship between institutions and corruption (Lederman et al. 2005, Méndez and 
Sepúlveda 2006, Aidt 2009, Dreher et al. 2009, Meon and Weill 2009, among others), there is 
a very limited literature which investigates the relationship between corruption and 
emigration.  
 
Lederman et al. (2005) investigating the role of political institutions in determining the 
existence of corruption argue that parliamentary systems, higher levels of democracy, 
political stability, and freedom of press are all associated with lower levels of corruption. 
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Examining the effect of corruption on growth under different political regimes, Méndez and 
Sepúlveda (2006), find evidence of a non-monotonic relationship between corruption and 
growth. They show that corruption promotes economic growth at low levels of incidence and   
affects growth negatively at high levels of incidence. Aidt (2003), similarly argues that in 
countries with well developed institutions, corruption has a significant negative impact on 
growth, while in countries with poor institutions, corruption has no effect on growth. Dreher 
et al. (2009) construct a model which captures the relationship between institutional quality, 
the shadow economy and corruption. They show that an improvement in institutional quality 
reduces the size of the shadow economy directly, and corruption both directly and indirectly
2
. 
Meon and Weill (2009) on the contrary, show that the adverse effects of corruption are lower 
in countries with less well developed institutions.  
 
Studies on the relationship between emigration and source country institutions are undertaken 
by Beine and Sekatt (2013) and Docquier et al. (2010). Beine and Sekatt (2013) dividing 
emigration into two groups, total emigration and skilled emigration, conclude that total 
emigration affects all institutions positively with the exception of voice and accountability. 
Similarly, Docquier et al. (2010) examining the influence of emigration on source country 
institutions, observe that brain drain has an ambiguous effect on institutions, while unskilled 
emigration has a positive effect on institutions.  
 
The literature which investigates the influence of corruption on emigration is sparse. Dimnat 
et al. (2013) examining  the influence of corruption on out-migration, by dividing migration 
into two groups – skilled migration and average migration for  a group of countries over the  
1985 to 2000 period, show that  corruption acts as a push factor for out-migration, 
                                                          
2
 See Schneider and Enste (2000) for a survey of the consequences of shadow economies. 
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particularly skilled migration. They observe that corruption weakens the returns to education, 
in particular, that of the skilled group. Ariu and Squicciarini (2013) investigating how 
corruption affects the inflows and outflows of migration for a group of countries, show that 
corruption is detrimental for both migrant inflows and outflows. They argue that corruption 
leads to the emigration of highly skilled nationals, and reduces the immigration of foreign 
workers, thus leading to a net shortage of high skilled workers. This effect has adverse effects 
in the long run, as it leads to a continuous decline of a nation’s human capital stock.  
 
The present study extends upon the existing literature by arguing that corruption not only 
affects the migration decisions of those with high levels of educational attainment, but also 
those with middle and low levels of educational attainment. Corruption can increase the 
emigration rate of the tertiary qualified group due to high levels of human capital investment 
and expectation of high skill premiums (Dimant et al. 2013). Additionally, if the inequality 
generated by corruption leads to an increase in progressive tax rates, this could act as a 
disincentive to those with higher educational qualifications (Dimnat et al. 2013). If jobs are 
granted on the basis of political connections rather than merit, this could also de-motivate 
those with high levels of educational attainment, encouraging them to emigrate to countries 
that are less corrupt. Corruption however, may not only increase the emigration rates of those 
with high levels of educational attainment, but also those with medium and low levels of 
educational attainment. Higher levels of unemployment and inequality generated by 
corruption can induce those with medium and low levels of educational attainment to 
emigrate. Dincer et al. (2012) argue that individuals belonging to low income groups (low 
levels of educational attainment) could pay a higher proportion of their income in the form of 
bribe payments. Similarly, corruption can channel government expenditure away from the 
provision of essential services such as education and health that benefit those with lower 
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levels of educational attainment most. Therefore deteriorating living conditions could also 
increase the emigration rates of those with medium and low levels of educational attainment. 
 
Studies have indicated that the relation between corruption and growth may well be non-
linear (Méndez and Sepúlveda 2006, Aidt et al. 2008). Méndez and Sepúlveda (2006) argue 
that the type of political regime is important for the relation between corruption and growth. 
They find evidence in favour of a non-linear relationship between corruption and growth in 
countries that are politically free, as opposed to those which are not.  A growth maximizing 
level of corruption is observed for countries which are politically free. Aidt (2003), also 
investigating for threshold effects between corruption and growth, argues that corruption has 
a significant negative impact on growth in countries with well developed institutions and no 
effect on growth in countries with weak institutions. It is therefore not unreasonable to expect 
corruption to have non-linear effects on emigration with emigration rates initially increasing 
at low levels of corruption and then declining as corruption increases.  If living conditions 
continue to deteriorate as corruption increases, the increased inequality generated by 
corruption can increase liquidity constraints, particularly among those with medium and low 
levels of educational attainment, reducing their ability to emigrate
3
. Corruption can 
additionally, by weakening the tax systems increase tax evasion. This reduces resources 
available for social welfare spending (Gupta et al. 2002) which primarily benefit those from 
the lower income groups, making it more difficult for them to emigrate. Therefore, as 
corruption continues to increase, the emigration rates among those with low and medium 
levels of educational attainment could decline. 
 
 
                                                          
3
 See Mckenzie and Rapoport (2007) for non linear effects between wealth and emigration . 
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Following from this, the three core hypotheses, we investigate are the following: 
(1) If corruption in a country increases, the emigration rates of those with high 
educational attainment increases, ceteris paribus; 
(2) If corruption in a country increases, the emigration rate of those with middle and low 
levels of educational attainment increases up to a certain threshold and then decreases. 
(3) The ability of those with medium and low levels of educational attainment to emigrate 
falls as inequality increases. 
 
3.  Description of the Data 
Panel data covering the 1995-2010 period with observations corresponding to five year 
intervals are used. Data on emigration rates by educational level are from Brücker et al. 
(2013). This includes data for the emigration rate of men and women over 25 by three 
educational levels, high, middle and low. Emigrants with upper-secondary education are 
classified as middle, those with post-secondary education as high and those with less than 
upper-secondary education (including lower-secondary, primary and no schooling) as low.   
 
 
The main independent variable of interest, is corruption. Two measures of corruption are 
used in the empirical study that follows. One is the corruption measure from Transparency 
International (TI). Here the estimate of corruption ranges from 0 (totally corrupt) to 10 (not 
corrupt). The other is the estimate of corruption from Kaufmann et al. (2012) which ranges 
from approximately -2.5 (totally corrupt) to 2.5 (not corrupt). In order to simplify the 
interpretation of empirical results the measures of corruption have been reversed so that 0 
stands for not corrupt and 10 totally corrupt on the TI measure. The Kaufmann et al. measure 
has been rescaled so that 0 stands for not corrupt and +5 for totally corrupt to maintain 
9 
 
consistency with the TI measure. Therefore, higher values on these two indices indicate 
higher levels of corruption. 
 
 
A number of other control variables are used in the empirical analysis. GDP per capita is used 
to control for the level of development of a country. Mauro (1998) and Wei (2001) argue that 
corruption changes the size and composition of public expenditure away from vital sectors 
such as health and education. This could increase the emigration rate, in particular, that of the 
group with low and medium levels of educational attainment. We incorporate government 
expenditure devoted to education as a percentage of GDP to control for this. Evidence shows 
that corruption can also increase unemployment and inequality thus reducing welfare (Gould 
and Amaro-Reyes, 1983, Dimant et al. 2013), acting as a push factor for labour migration. 
We control for inequality by using the Gini coefficient and for employment by using the 
labour force participation rate. The literature also shows that institutions affect corruption 
(Lederman et al. 2005) and also the rate of emigration (Borjas 1987). The polity index is used 
to capture institutions (Docquier et al.2010). Table 1 provides summary statistics for the data 
used in the empirical analysis.  
[Table 1, about here] 
We also include non-linear terms for corruption (Méndez and Sepúlveda 2006, Aidt 2003).  A 
preliminary inspection of scatter plots between the TI corruption index and emigration rates  
indicate non-linearity in the relationship between corruption and emigration rates for those 
with middle and low levels of educational attainment.  
 
[Figures 1-3, about here] 
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4.  The Model and Estimation Methodology 
 
The preliminary estimation is carried out using panel fixed effects. Both fixed and random 
effects models were estimated. However, based on the results of the Hausman test, the fixed 
effects model was found to be relatively more reliable. Therefore the paper reports results 
only for panel fixed effect estimation. The fixed effects estimator permits controlling for any 
unobserved country-specific time-invariant effects. The panel data model can be expressed by 
equation (1) as follows: 
    it it i t itM X         (1) 
where itM  is the rate of emigration from country i, in period t. The estimation is carried out 
by disaggregating emigration by education level, high, medium and low. Xit is a vector which 
includes all independent variables, including corruption and the control variables. i captures 
the country specific effect and t, takes into account the relevant time effect. uit is a random 
error term that captures the effect of all omitted variables. Interaction terms are added to the 
above specification to investigate desired differential effects. 
 
It can be argued that all explanatory variables used in our empirical model are not strictly 
exogenous. An approach that allows controlling for the joint endogeneity of explanatory 
variables through the use of internal instruments is the Arellano-Bover (1995) -Blundell Bond 
(1998) system GMM estimator. In summary, equation (2), which involves variables in levels, 
is combined with equation (3), which involves variables in first differences. Equation (2) is 
instrumented by lagged first differences of the variables, whereas equation (3) is 
instrumented by lagged variables in levels.  
 1   it it it i t itM y X          (2) 
 1 1 2 1 1–  (  M ) ( )  ( )      it it it it it it t it itM M M X X                (3) 
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The variable definitions are the same as above for equation (1), with lagged values of the 
variables now entering the equation. The system GMM estimation is also carried out by 
disaggregating emigration by education level. Two diagnostic tests, the Hansen test for over-
identifying restrictions under which the null hypothesis is that the instruments are not 
correlated with the residuals, and the Arellano-Bond test for second order correlation in the 
first differenced residuals are carried out. 
 
As a further test for endogeneity, instrumental variable (IV) estimation could be useful in 
addition to the system GMM. In the IV estimation, a good instrument should be correlated to 
corruption and not influence public debt through other channels. Among the variables used as 
instruments for corruption are: ethnolinguistic fractionalization (Mauro 1995), the settler 
mortality data of Acemoglu et al. (2001) (Ahlin and Pang 2008), latitude (Gupta et al. 2002, 
Delavallade 2006), the initial level of corruption (Gupta et al. 2002). Following Gupta et al. 
(2002), we use the initial level of corruption as an instrument for corruption.  A Sargan test 
for over-identifying restrictions under which the null hypothesis is that the instruments are 
not correlated with the residuals is carried out under the IV estimation. 
 
5.  Empirical Results  
 
5.1 Fixed Effects Estimation 
 
The preliminary estimation is carried out using fixed effects estimation to control for time 
invariant country effects. Results are reported in Table 2. Column (1)-(3) reports results for 
high, middle and low levels of educational attainment respectively, using  the TI corruption 
index and columns (4)-(6) for the same, using the Kaufmann et al. corruption index. Control 
variables are included for per capita income to account for the level of development of the 
country, government expenditure on education to GDP as higher levels of government 
12 
 
expenditure on education can reduce emigration, and the polity index to capture institutions.  
All variables except for the polity index have been converted into logarithmic form for the 
empirical estimation. 
 
 [Table 2, about here] 
For emigrants with high levels of educational attainment, columns (1) and (4), only the linear 
coefficient on the TI and Kaufmann et al. corruption index is statistically significant. The 
quadratic term is not significant. The results suggest that as corruption increases, the 
emigration rate of those with high levels of educational attainment increase. In column (1) for 
example, the linear coefficient on the TI corruption index suggests that a 1 unit increase in 
the corruption index increases the emigration rate by 0.34%. For those with medium and low 
levels of educational attainment however, columns (2) and (3) and columns (5) and (6), the 
linear terms are positive, and the quadratic terms are negative, suggesting that the emigration 
rate of those with medium and  low levels of educational attainment increase at low levels of 
corruption and then begins to decline beyond a certain point
4
.  This is observed for both the 
TI and Kaufmann et al. corruption indices. Calculated threshold points for those with medium 
levels of educational attainment indicate that beyond a threshold point of 3.5 on the TI index 
and 3.6 on the Kaufamann et al. index, that emigration begins to decline. Similarly, beyond a 
threshold point of 3.6 on the TI index and 3.9 on the Kaufmann et al. index, the emigration of 
those with low levels of educational attainment begins to decline. The linear coefficient on 
the TI corruption index in column (2) for those with medium levels of educational attainment 
suggests that a 1 unit increase in the corruption index initially increases the emigration rate 
by 0.20%.  
                                                          
4 The R2 terms in the quadratic models indicated that the explanatory power of the model is increased when the 
quadratic term was incorporated into the models. A F test further rejected the hypothesis that the  regression was 
linear at the 1% and 5% significance levels against the alternative that it was quadratic.  
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The results also suggest that the level of development of a country as measured by per capita 
income has a significant effect on the emigration rates of all three groups. A higher per capita 
income reduces the incentive of those with high educational attainment to emigrate, while it 
increases the incentive of those with low and middle levels of educational attainment to 
emigrate. This is possibly because it increases the ability of these two groups to emigrate. 
The coefficients on government expenditure devoted to education is statistically significant at 
the 10% level for the emigration rate of those with medium levels of education and 
significant at the 5% and 1% levels in columns (3) and (6) for the emigration rate of those 
with low levels of education, indicating that if the government devotes a larger proportion of 
GDP to education, it would lead to a fall in the emigration rates of those with medium and 
low levels of educational attainment. This perhaps is because these groups stand to gain most 
from the government provision of services. The coefficients on the polity index are 
statistically significant at the 10% level for emigrants with high and medium levels of 
education suggesting that better institutions act as a deterrent to the emigration of these 
groups. 
 
5.2 Additional Control Variables 
 
[Table 3, about here] 
We re-estimate the model by incorporating more control variables for inequality (the Gini 
coefficient), population density and employment (the labour force participation rate). The 
results are reported on Table 3. The highest emigration rate is observed for those with high 
levels of educational attainment consistent with the results obtained in Table 2. In column (1) 
for example, the coefficient on the TI index suggests that a 1 unit increase in the corruption 
index leads to an increase of 0.36% in the emigration rate of those with high levels of 
14 
 
educational attainment. Once again, the coefficient on the quadratic term for this group is not 
statistically significant. The estimated linear and quadratic coefficients on the corruption 
indices are statistically significant for those with medium and low levels of educational 
attainment, suggesting that the emigration rate of those with middle and low levels of 
educational attainment increase, and then begins to decline beyond a certain point. Calculated 
threshold points suggest that the emigration rate of those with medium levels of educational 
attainment decline after corruption reaches a level of 3.7 and 3.4 on the TI and Kaufmann et 
al. corruption index respectively and the emigration of those with low levels of educational 
attainment decline when corruption reaches a level of 3.4 and 3.6 on the TI and Kaufmann et 
al. index respectively. The coefficients on per capita income are positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level for all groups. Government expenditure influences the emigration 
rate of those with middle and low levels of educational attainment, while the polity index has 
a significant effect on those with high levels of educational attainment. An increase in 
inequality as indicated by the Gini coefficient leads statistically significant fall in the 
emigration rate of those with middle and low levels of educational attainment, in particular 
those with low levels of educational attainment. The coefficient on population density is 
statistically significant in all columns with the exception of column (6). The results indicate 
that the higher the LFPR, the lower will be the emigration rate of all groups. 
 [Table 4, about here] 
 
 
In Table 4 we incorporate an interaction term for the Gini coefficient x corruption,  in order 
to see if inequality increases the impact of corruption on emigration. We also include wage 
and salaried workers as a % of total employed as wages act as a push factor for emigration. 
The results suggest that greater inequality does intensify the impact of corruption on 
emigration, that is, reduces the ability to emigrate. Similarly, earning a wage reduces the 
15 
 
incentive for those from all educational groups to emigrate. The linear coefficients on the 
main variable of interest, corruption, is statistically significant for all groups and the 
quadratic term is statistically significant for those with middle and low levels of educational 
attainment as before. The results are in general, qualitatively similar to those obtained above.  
 
 
 
5.3 Correcting for Endogeneity 
Next the estimation is carried out by using the system GMM and IV methods to address 
potential endogeneity concerns. Columns (1)-(3) report results for system GMM estimation 
and columns (4)-(6) reports results for IV estimation. Given that the estimation using the TI 
index and Kaufmann et al. index yield similar results, we report only results using the TI 
index
5
.  
[Table 5, about here] 
The GMM estimates indicate once again, a linear relationship between corruption and 
emigration rate for the group with high levels of educational attainment, and a quadratic 
(inverted U) shaped relationship between corruption and the emigration rate of those with 
medium and low levels of educational attainment. High per capita income has a positive 
statistically significant effect on the emigration rates of those with middle and low 
educational attainment and a negative impact on those with high levels of educational 
attainment. The results are in general, broadly consistent with those obtained above. The 
Hansen test and the serial correlation test in the system GMM estimation confirm that the 
moments conditions cannot be rejected.  
 
                                                          
5
 Results using the Kaufmann et al. index yield qualitatively similar results. 
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The correlation between corruption and emigration appears to be robust to the inclusion of a 
number of control variables. We need however, to ensure that the direction of causality is 
from corruption to emigration. For this, using instrumental variable (IV) estimation could be 
useful in addition to fixed effects and system GMM. To serve as a good instrument, the 
instrument should be correlated to corruption and not influence emigration through other 
channels. Among the variables used as instruments for corruption are: ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization (Mauro 1995), the settler mortality data of Acemoglu et al. (2001) (Ahlin 
and Pang 2008), latitude (Gupta et al. 2002, Delavallade 2006), the initial level of corruption 
(Gupta et al. 2002)
6
. As the ethnolinguistic fractionalization index could also be correlated 
with emigration, and the settler mortality rate and latitude lead to a significant fall in number 
of observations, we use the initial level of corruption as an instrument for corruption (see 
Gupta et al. 2002) in the IV estimation. The results of the IV estimation are consistent with 
those obtained under the fixed effects and system GMM estimation methods. Corruption has 
a linear effect on the emigration rate of those with high educational attainment and a non-
linear effect on those with middle and low educational attainment. The general conclusions 
broadly remain the same. The Sargan test indicates that the instruments are valid and 
uncorrelated with the error term. 
 
5.4 Splitting the Sample 
Given the robust evidence in favour of an inverted U-shaped relationship between corruption 
and the emigration rate of those with medium and low levels of educational attainment, we 
split the sample into two by country and time – those falling below the mean Gini index of 43 
                                                          
6 Triesman (2000) finds that countries with British heritage, Protestant tradition, higher per capita GDP,  
uninterrupted democracy, and greater openness to imports rank lower  on the corruption index, and  those with 
Federal states tend to rank higher compared to those with unitary states. 
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(low inequality in income distribution) and above the mean Gini index (high inequality in 
income distribution), to investigate if the effect of corruption on the emigration rates of these 
two groups is conditional on income distribution. Each of these groups is divided into two 
groups based upon inequality in income distribution. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 reports 
regression results for the influence of corruption on the emigration rate of those with medium 
and low levels of educational attainment; and columns (3) and (4) report regression results for 
countries with high levels of income inequality. We only report results for the estimation 
carried out with the TI index. The estimation using the Kaufmann et al. index yields similar 
results. 
[Table 6, about here] 
The results in columns (1) and (2) indicate that in countries with low levels of income 
inequality, the emigration rate of both groups with medium and low levels of education, 
increase, and then decreases beyond a certain threshold. Calculated threshold points indicate 
that for the group with medium levels of educational attainment, emigration rates begin to fall 
after reaching a threshold point of 3.44 and for those with low levels of educational 
attainment at a threshold point of 3.73. Per capita income has a statistically significant 
positive effect on emigration and increased government expenditure on education reduces 
emigration. Increased labour force participation reduces emigration while the coefficient on 
population density is statistically significant only in column (1). 
 
Columns (3) and (4) report results for countries with high levels of income inequality. Note 
that here only the linear term is statistically significant and negative, suggesting that in the 
presence of high income inequality, corruption reduces the ability of those with both medium 
and low levels of educational attainment to emigrate. 
18 
 
6.  Conclusions 
This paper examines the relationship between corruption and the emigration rate of those 
with high, medium and low levels of educational attainment. The results support our three 
hypotheses. The empirical results indicate that as corruption increases the emigration rate of 
those with high levels of educational attainment also increase. The emigration rate of those 
with middle and low levels of educational attainment however, increases at initial levels of 
corruption and then decreases beyond a certain point exhibiting an inverted U-shaped pattern. 
When we split emigrants with medium and low levels of educational attainment by income 
distribution, we find evidence of a fall in the emigration rate of both these groups due to an 
increase in income inequality. It is possible that increased inequality generated by corruption 
increase liquidity constraints faced by those with middle and low levels of educational 
attainment, thus reducing their ability to emigrate beyond a certain point.  Calculated 
threshold points are in the range of 3.4 – 3.9 on the TI and Kaufmann et al. index. 
Government policy should focus on controlling corruption which in turn would lead to funds 
being channelled more productively into education and also lead to a fall in inequality which 
would reduce emigration. The control of corruption would also lead to the retention of those 
with high levels of educational attainment and lead to better labour market outcomes with 
employment based on merit rather than political connections.  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable 
 
 
Obs 
 
 
Mean 
 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Minimum 
 
 
Maximum 
 
 
Source 
Emigration of Low Educational 
Attainment 460 4.32 9.70 0.02 64.34 
Brücker et al. 
(2013) 
Emigration of Middle Educational 
Attainment 460 4.52 7.18 0.04 42.01 
Brücker et al. 
(2013) 
Emigration of High Educational 
Attainment 460 17.44 17.66 0.14 84.89 
Brücker et al. 
(2013) 
GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$) 441 
 
2068.29 
 
1974.06 
 
50.04 
 
8610.02 
 
WDI 
Government Expenditure on Education 
(% GDP) 419 14.54 6.47 3.86 54.80 
WDI 
Labour Force Participation Rate (% of 
total population 16-64) 448 66.95 10.88 42.40 90.80 
WDI 
Population Density (people per square 
km of land area) 460 100.57 156.63 1.48 1160.99 
WDI 
Wage and Salaried Workers (% of  total 
employed) 260 49.56 22.96 5.00 93.20 
WDI 
Gini Index 285 43.42 9.00 25.62 62.78 WDI 
Corruption Index Kaufmann et al. 450 3.05 0.61 0.93 4.42 
Kaufmann et 
al. (2012) 
Corruption Index TI  405 6.90 1.15 2.80 10.00 
Transparency 
International 
(2013) 
Polity Index (ranges from -10 (hereditary 
monarchy) to +10 (consolidated 
democracy) 460 2.99 5.80 -9.00 10.00 
Marshall and 
Jaggers 
(2013) 
Note: Corruption K = Corruption index of Kaufmann et al. has been rescaled so that 0 stands for not corrupt and 
+5 for totally corrupt and Corruption TI = Corruption index Transparency International has been reversed so 
that 0 stands for not corrupt and 10 totally corrupt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
Table 2: Fixed Effects Estimation  
Dependent Variables: Emigration Rate of those with High, Middle and Low Levels of 
Educational Attainment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 High Medium  Low High Medium Low 
Corruption TI 0.344 
(0.166)** 
0.201 
(0.040)*** 
0.156 
(0.112)** 
- - - 
Corruption TI
2
 -0.055 
(0.040) 
-0.029 
(0.014)** 
-0.020 
(0.008)*** 
- - - 
Corruption K - - -  0283 
(0.041)*** 
0.232 
(0.103)** 
0.195 
(0.085)*** 
Corruption K
2
 - - - -0.132 
(0.133) 
-0.032 
(0.012)*** 
-0.027 
(0.012)** 
Per Capita 
Income 
-0.554 
(0.073)*** 
0.330 
(0.064)*** 
0.707 
(0.072)*** 
-0.707 
(0.072)*** 
0.306 
(0.067)*** 
0.617 
(0.074)*** 
Government  
Expenditure on 
Education 
-0.139 
(0.160) 
-0.117 
(0.063)* 
-0.103 
(0.032)** 
-0.103 
(0.093) 
-0.171 
(0.102)* 
-0.173 
(0.070)*** 
Polity -0.020 
(0.010)* 
0.031 
(0.017)* 
0.011 
(0.019) 
0.011 
(0.005)* 
-0.025 
(0.015)* 
0.014 
(0.017) 
R
2
 0.48 0.55 0.58 0.52 0.53 0.56 
Observations 345 345 345 377 377 377 
       
Note:  Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis.  *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
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Table 3: Fixed Effects Estimation with Additional Control Variables 
Dependent Variables:   Emigration Rate of those with High, Middle and Low Levels of 
Educational Attainment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 High Medium  Low High Medium Low 
Corruption TI 0.363 
(0.074)*** 
0.212 
(0.102)** 
0.128 
(0.019)*** 
- - - 
Corruption TI
2
 -0.021 
(0.040) 
-0.029 
(0.018)* 
-0.019 
(0.008)** 
- - - 
Corruption K - - -  0.376 
(0.105)*** 
0.290 
(0.060)*** 
0.122 
(0.024)*** 
Corruption K
2
 - - - -0.102 
(0.113) 
-0.043 
(0.023)* 
-0.017 
(0.0101)* 
Per Capita 
Income 
-0.526 
(0.108)*** 
0.364 
(0.102)*** 
0.420 
(0.109)*** 
-0.502 
(0.111)*** 
0.308 
(0.108)*** 
0.405 
(0.166)*** 
Government 
Expenditure on 
Education 
-0.040 
(0.129) 
-0.029 
(0.018)* 
-0.125 
(0.061)** 
-0.045 
(0.013) 
-0.120 
(0.065)* 
-0.136 
(0.053)*** 
Polity -0.031 
(0.010)* 
-0.020 
(0.020) 
-0.011 
(0.021) 
-0.011 
(0.014)* 
-0.018 
(0.014) 
-0.011 
(0.012) 
Gini Index -0.012 
(0.008) 
-0.007 
(0.003)** 
-0.013 
(0.005)*** 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
-0.007 
(0.004)* 
-0.015 
(0.005)*** 
Population 
Density 
0.513 
(0.231)** 
0.121 
(0.055)* 
0.124 
(0.074)* 
0.604 
(0.213)*** 
0.207 
(0.120)* 
0.054 
(0.044) 
LFPR -0.180 
(0.073)*** 
-0.254 
(0.122)** 
 
-0.217 
(0.071)*** 
-0.190 
(0.070)*** 
-0.481 
(0.239)** 
-0.201 
(0.079)*** 
R
2
 0.60 0.67 0.70 0.62 0.68 0.71 
Observations 229 229 229 243 243 243 
       
Note:  Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis.  *,  **,  *** Significant at the 10%,  5%  and 1% levels 
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Table 4: Fixed Effects Estimation with More Control Variables and Interaction Terms 
Dependent Variables:   Emigration Rate of those with High, Middle and Low Levels of 
Educational Attainment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 High Medium  Low High Medium Low 
Corruption TI 0.305 
(0.047)** 
0.247 
(0.062)*** 
0.124 
(0.062)** 
- - - 
Corruption TI
2
 -0.009 
(0.008) 
-0.035 
(0.023)* 
-0.018 
(0.009)** 
- - - 
Corruption K - - -  0.307 
(0.038)*** 
0.290 
(0.103)*** 
0.108 
(0.008)*** 
Corruption K
2
 - - - -0.080 
(0.102) 
-0.043 
(0.019)** 
-0.014 
(0.007)** 
Per Capita 
Income 
-0.334 
(0.149)*** 
0.197 
(0.065)*** 
0.673 
(0.163)*** 
-0.215 
(0.081)*** 
0.172 
(0.070)*** 
0.666 
(0.174)*** 
Government 
Expenditure on 
Education 
-0.049 
(0.138) 
-0.132 
(0.082)* 
-0.148 
(0.051)*** 
-0.142 
(0.113) 
-0.059 
(0.029)** 
-0.269 
(0.148)* 
Polity -0.050 
(0.025)** 
-0.041 
(0.015) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
0.023 
(0.011)** 
-0.014 
(0.014) 
0.020 
(0.022) 
Gini Index -0.085 
(0.029)*** 
-0.050 
(0.019)*** 
-0.081 
(0.031)*** 
-0.063 
(0.022)*** 
-0.031 
(0.014)** 
-0.052 
(0.024)** 
Population 
Density  
0.104 
(0.027)*** 
0.270 
(0.271) 
0.124 
(0.074)* 
0.129 
(0.028)*** 
0.255 
(0.220) 
0.516 
(0.314)* 
LFPR -0.161 
(0.034)*** 
-0.415 
(0.157)*** 
 
-0.016 
(0.009)* 
-0.160 
(0.050)*** 
-0.425 
(0.153)*** 
-0.130 
(0.084)* 
Wage 
Employment 
-0.300 
(0.110)*** 
-0.523 
(0.132)*** 
-0.495 
(0.148)*** 
-0.404 
(0.192)** 
-0.367 
(0.153)*** 
-0.425 
(0.129)*** 
Gini 
Coefficient* 
Corruption  
-0.022 
(0.008)*** 
-0.015 
(0.008)* 
-0.026 
(0.009)*** 
-0.015 
(0.006)*** 
-0.009 
(0.003)*** 
-0.016 
(0.007)** 
R
2
 0.73 0.72 0.75 0.78 0.73 0.79 
Observations 159 159 159 156 156 156 
       
Note:  Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis.  *,  **,  *** Significant at the 10%,  5%  and 1% levels 
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Table 5: System GMM and IV Estimation 
Dependent Variables:   Emigration Rate of those with High, Middle and Low Levels of 
Educational Attainment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 System GMM IV Estimation 
 High Medium  Low High Medium Low 
Corruption TI 0.316 
(0.045)*** 
0.217 
(0.051)*** 
0.120 
(0.042)*** 
0.334 
(0.041)*** 
0.210 
(0.101)** 
0.126 
(0.103)** 
Corruption TI
2
 -0.010 
(0.009) 
-0.031 
(0.015)** 
-0.016 
(0.005)*** 
-0.018 
(0.017) 
-0.030 
(0.014)** 
-0.016 
(0.009)* 
Per Capita Income -0.315 
(0.109)*** 
0.184 
(0.045)*** 
0.520 
(0.142)*** 
-0.219 
(0.080)*** 
0.181 
(0.069)*** 
0.520 
(0.160)*** 
Government 
Expenditure on 
Education 
-0.123 
(0.118) 
-0.130 
(0.061)** 
-0.132 
(0.096)* 
-0.131 
(0.123) 
-0.044 
(0.022)** 
-0.230 
(0.140)** 
Polity -0.040 
(0.020)* 
-0.030 
(0.015)** 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.020 
(0.010)** 
-0.017 
(0.010)* 
-0.021 
(0.023) 
Gini Coefficient -0.045 
(0.039) 
-0.047 
(0.016)*** 
-0.075 
(0.021)*** 
-0.052 
(0.022)*** 
-0.030 
(0.015)** 
-0.041 
(0.020)** 
Population Density 0.110 
(0.017) 
0.215 
(0.121)* 
0.120 
(0.056)** 
0.120 
(0.024)*** 
0.240 
(0.110)** 
0.452 
(0.114)*** 
LFPR -0.167 
(0.030)*** 
-0.420 
(0.147)*** 
 
-0.018 
(0.009)* 
-0.154 
(0.050)*** 
-0.420 
(0.150)*** 
-0.126 
(0.064)*** 
Gini Index * 
Corruption   
-0.018 
(0.007)*** 
-0.020 
(0.008)*** 
-0.024 
(0.009)*** 
-0.015 
(0.006)*** 
-0.010 
(0.004)*** 
-0.018 
(0.009)** 
Lagged Dependent 
Variable  
0.665 
(0.312)** 
0.671 
(0.221)*** 
0.712 
(0.245) 
- - - 
Hansen Test for 
Overidentifying 
Restrictions: p value 
0.21 0.25 0.19    
Arellano-Bond Test for 
2
nd
 order 
autocorrelation: value 
0.16 0.18 0.21 - - - 
Hansen Test for 
Overidentifying 
Restrictions: p value 
- - - 0.32 0.30 0.27 
R
2
 - - - 0.77 0.74 0.70 
Observations 165 165 165 243 243 243 
       
Note: Standard errors reported in parenthesis. ***,  **,  *, significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively.  
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Table 6: Splitting the Sample by Income Distribution 
Dependent Variable: Emigration rate of those with Medium and Low Levels of Educational 
Attainment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Below Mean Gini Index 
(Low Income Inequality) 
Above Mean Gini Index 
(High Income Inequality) 
 Medium Low Medium Low 
Corruption TI 0.131 
(0.043)*** 
0.112 
(0.016)*** 
-0.140 
(0.040)*** 
-0.118 
(0.040)*** 
Corruption TI
2
 -0.014 
(0.007)* 
-0.015 
(0.007)** 
-0.010 
(0.011) 
-0.121 
(0.131) 
Per Capita 
Income 
0.126 
(0.050)*** 
0.164 
(0.050)*** 
0.110 
(0.005)*** 
0.131 
(0.015)** 
Government 
Expenditure 
-0.018 
(0.010)* 
-0.020 
(0.012)** 
-0.015 
(0.007)* 
-0.018 
(0.008)** 
Polity -0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.001)* 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
Population 
Density 
0.131 
(0.081)* 
0.119 
(0.155) 
0.114 
(0.061)* 
0.113 
(0.131) 
LFPR -0.120 
(0.027)*** 
-0.212 
(0.102)** 
 
-0.134 
(0.032)*** 
-0.101 
(0.071)* 
R
2
 0.78 0.74   
Observations 123 123 219 219 
Note: Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. ***,  **,  *, significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
28 
 
Figure 1: Emigration Ratio of those with High Levels of Educational Attainment and TI 
Corruption Index 
 
 
Note: The TI corruption index has been reversed so that 0 stands for not corrupt and 10 totally corrupt. 
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Figure 2: Emigration Ratio of those with Medium Levels of Educational Attainment 
and TI Corruption Index 
 
 
Note: The TI corruption index has been reversed so that 0 stands for not corrupt and 10 totally corrupt. 
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Figure 3: Emigration Ratio of those with Low Levels of Educational Attainment and TI 
Corruption Index 
 
 
Note: The TI corruption index has been reversed so that 0 stands for not corrupt and 10 totally corrupt. 
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